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INCOME TAX AND INEQUALITY:
WHAT CONSTITUTES
WELFARE STATE EXPENDITURE?
by
Gordon W. Ternowetsky
Social Administration Research Unit
Faculty of Social Work
University of Regina
ABSTRACT
This paper examines 1981 taxation returns for the Province of
Saskatchewan and Canada as a whole. The analysis examined the
extent to which legal tax breaks benefit the rich and act to reinforce
income inequality. The question of what constitutes government
social spending is also raised. It is argued that tax breaks are a form of
social expenditure that result in a tremendous drain on government
revenue. The findings show that if progressive taxation was enforced,
even for the few very rich Canadians (those earning over $200,000 a
year), governments in 1981 would have an extra 1.1 billion dollars
available for other social programs.
Introduction
At the close of the 1984 federal election campaign, the leaders of
the three mainline political parties had achieved something of a con-
census. All agreed on the need for reform of the Canadian Income
Tax Act. Each leader put forth an election platform that promised to
change a taxation system that permitted some of the richest people in
Canada to pay little or no personal income tax.
One dificulty with the tax debate witnessed in the 1984 election is
that it was somewhat truncated. All we really learned was that some
of the rich pay little or no tax. Other crucial corners of personal taxa-
tion in Canada were left uncovered. For example, what is equally
problematic is that legal tax breaks both reinforce income inequality
237
and produce a tremendous strain on government revenue. These out-
comes, although perhaps implied, were not dealt with directly in the
election debates on income tax.
One purpose of this paper is to explore these latter issues in order
to provide information that will permit Canadians to engage in an
informed political debate on the taxation choices open to us. Revenue
Canada taxation statistics for 1981 will be compared for Saskatchewan
and Canada as a whole to evaluate the impact of tax breaks on ine-
quality and foregone government revenue.
A further aim of this paper is to raise the question of what consti-
tutes government social spending? Too often the issue of social wel-
fare expenditures is limited to outlays on income support and related
services for the poor and those in need (Ternowetsky, 1984; Jamorizik,
1983, 1984). By focussing on taxation benefits, this paper aims to
broaden the scope of the expenditure debate. It will bring under scru-
tiny an inequitable system of government social spending where 'the
benefits get larger the richer you are' (NAPO, 1984:30).
Social Welfare and Hidden Welfare
The theme of fiscal responsibility in social spending currently
being witnessed in Canada is somewhat misleading. It directs the gaze
of policy priorities and cut-back scenarios to either universal entitle-
ments or to more selective welfare programs targetted for the poor.
What tend to be missed out are programs and policies that annually
transfer huge sums of money to the affluent in Canadian society. One
of the most lucrative areas of transfer payments that are hidden and
of prime benefit to the rich, comes in the form of the subsidies and
allowable deductions they gain through the personal taxation system.
At tax time, most of us look forward to utilizing legal tax breaks
in order to enhance our own personal income. It is not the reasonable
income gains that result from the deductions claimed by most people
that are worrisome. The problem is that it is the judicious use of these
allowances that, in 1981, permitted 239 Canadians with incomes
exceeding $250,000 to avoid paying personal income tax.
Research on personal taxation exemptions is rather limited in
Canada and nearly non-existent in Saskatchewan. Two important
national studies are the National Council of Welfare's Hidden Wel-
fare System (1976) and the Hidden Welfare System Revisited (1979).
These reports probe the workings of tax exemptions and document
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several avenues through which federal and provincial governments
end up transfering income to the wealthy through the "spending side
of taxation." These benefits are available in any array of some five
personal exemptions, twenty tax sheltered deductions and four tax
credits. While these deductions are for all tax payers, the National
Council of Welfare finds that benefits are skewed to high income
earners because high incomes are required before people can qualify
for tax benefits.
Not only do the rich, in disproportionate amounts, enhance their
own personal income through tax breaks, but these personal gains also
represent a substantial revenue loss to governments through what the
National Council of Welfare and others (Kesselman, 1977; Maslove,
1978) call government "tax expenditures." They are expenditures
because "by not collecting the full tax" the shortfall in government
revenue would be the same if the government had first collected the
full tax and then transferred this amount back to the individual The
National Council of Welfare (1976:13) outlines this argument in the
following way*
The government would have ended up with the same net
revenue and the taxpayer with the same net income.
Furthermore the government accounts would have shown
that it had spent [an expenditure However, because the
subsidy is accomplished through an exemption from taxes,
it never appears as a government expenditure.
In the Welfare System Revisited (1979.4) this position is
expanded:
Just because the Tax Act disguises its spending as tax
deductions, no one should be deceived into thinking that
tax expenditures are anything other than real spending -
every bit as real, in fact - as direct spending which attracts
so much attention.
The total costs associated with these expenditures are enormous
yet they are difficult to identify completely. It is estimated that in
1974 the revenue loss of only one-third of the available tax expendi-
ture programs was $6.4 billion (NCW 1976:16). By 1976 this third of
the available tax expenditures cost $7.1 billion, $800 million dollars
more than the federal deficit. By 1979 the money lost through tax
expenditures was $13.8 billion - 81 percent of the total tax revenue
for that year (NAPO, 1984).
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Personal taxation is, in theory, progressive, as it is based on the
ability to pay. Marginal tax rates increase as the tax payee' income
goes up. Again, in theory, Canadian income tax is designed to redistri-
bute income by altering the share of income going to different seg-
ments of the population.
Numerous studies of the post-World War II distribution of Cana-
dian incomes show, however, that over time taxation has had little
impact on income inequality (Ross, 1980, Nordah, 1981; Gillepsie, 1980,
Love and Wolfson, 1976; Drover and Moscovitch, 1981; Johnson, 1974,
1977, 1979). Periods of sustained growth up to the 70s did not result
in any marked re-distribution of incomes. Nor did Trudeau's "just
society" or the "Orange Paper" on income security in 70s lead to
greater income equality. No matter what data sources are used, the
findings are clear and consistent. The richest 20 percent of earners
continue to gain a greater share of the income than the lowest 60 per-
cent. The income that has been lost by the top earners seems to be
redistributed amongst groups of other high earners. As noted in other
advanced industrial economies, the post-war redistribution that takes
place is horizontal (from the rich to the well-off) rather than vertical
(the rich to the poor) (Ternowetsky, 1981, 1979, Smolensky, Pom-
merehne and Dalrymple, 1977; Wedderburn, 1972).
A major reason for the Canadian tax system's failure to redistri-
bute income is that progressivity is eroded by tax expenditures. This
message was clear in the 1966 Report of the Royal Commission on Tax-
ation (the Carter Commission). The Commission concluded that the
tax expenditure system makes a mockery out of the theoretical ideal
of progressivity. "[T]ax concessions are always inequitable, are fre-
quently inefficient, and tend to distort the allo cation of resources and
erode the tax base" (quoted in Young, 1981:230).
Recent findings of the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO,
1984) demonstrate the regressive impact of tax breaks. Without tax
breaks, those earning over $200,000 have a marginal tax rate around
43 percent. With tax expenditures, however, this group's actual tax
rate reduces to a rate which is only slightly higher than the average
tax paid by those earning between 25-30 thousand dollars a year.
However, even with tax expenditures, some progressivity is main-
tained until we reach the reported income bracket of over $200,000.
The group which gets the most back through government tax transfers
are the very rich, those with incomes above $200,000. Government
revenue that is lost through tax expenditure is clearly income that is
channelled directly to those who already have high incomes. Foregone
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tax expenditure revenue is as the National Council of Welfare (1979)
argues, "welfare for the rich."
A similar conclusion can be drawn when the distributional impact
of tax expenditures are looked at. In 1974 those earning under $5,000
received an average tax expenditure benefit of $243. Middle income
earners attained $788 while those earning above $50,000 acquired tax
expenditure benefits of nearly $4,000 (NCW, 1976:17). In terms of
decile shares, the top 10 percent of earners gained 36.1 percent of all
tax benefits which represented an average tax expenditure of $2,068.
The fifth (middle) decile attained 6.5 percent which equalled an aver-
age benefit of $372. The poorest 10 percent of income recipients did
not receive any tax savings or percentage of the tax expenditures in
that year. All of these findings suggest that fiscal welfare in Canada is
welfare that disproportionately serves to enhance the economic well-
being of the rich.
In 1984 the Saskatchewan government introduced a package of
"welfare reforms." A major purpose of these reforms was to make
welfare less attractive. Benefits for single unemployed employables
were cut by $185 to $345 a month and a volunteer work for welfare
program was initiated. The categorical approach to assistance and the
work-fare program appeared to contravene the cost-sharing guidelines
of the Canadian Assistance Plan. Still, these reforms were enacted,
seemingly with Ottawa's approval. This is important because spending
on programs for low income groups is willingly being scrutinized, cur-
tailed and rolled back while fiscal welfare, or hidden welfare for the
rich continues to thrive. One example is the planned 1984-85 federal
budget increase in tax sheltered Registered Retirement Savings Plan
(RRSP) contributions. Tax breaks of this type clearly favour the
wealthy. For example, in 1979, 60 percent of those earning over
$50,000 qualified for RRSP tax concessions. Approximately 23 percent
of those earning less than this amount obtained RRSP tax breaks. Peo-
ple with incomes below $10,000 acquired only 1.7 percent of all the
RRSP tax benefits in 1981 (McQuaig, 1984:12). The recent NAPO
study (1984) also shows that the dollar value of tax expenditure
benefits is not only increasing in size, but that tax expenditure pro-
grams are proliferating.
Some preliminary findings indicate that the situation is not dissimi-
lar in Saskatchewan. Several trends can be identified (Ternowetsky,
1984). First, there has been a jump in tax expenditure concessions
available for Saskatchewan residents. There were fewer tax shelters
in 1970 when only 4 people earning over $25,000 escaped paying tax.
By 1981, the number increased to 1,541 or 1.5 percent of those with
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incomes that exceed $25,000. A related trend is that, with the institu-
tionalization of tax breaks, the percentage paying no tax at all tends to
increase. Amongst the most affluent in Saskatchewan the chance of
not paying any personal income tax goes up after an income threshold
of $40,000 is surpassed. Also, by 1981, there were 5 Saskatchewan
residents earning over $200,000 that did not pay any personal income
tax (Ternowetsky, 1984).
Table 1 looks at tax expenditures in another way. It shows the
number of people obtaining income through tax expenditure transfers,
the average value of the transfer for each income group, and the
amount of government revenue that is lost to each income category
through tax expenditures. These taxation data are for Canadian and
Saskatchewan returns for 1981. (Included in these expenditures are
the sum of all allowable deductions, tax credits and personal exemp-
tions reported in Revenue Canada taxation statistics)
Several uniformities can be drawn from the comparisons in Table
1. First, there are relatively few earners with reported incomes above
$30 thousand in Canada and Saskatchewan. As incomes increase past
$30 thousand, the number of earners drops markedly. Another pat-
tern emerges in the total tax expenditure column. These data point to
the spending side of taxation, or the revenue that is lost to govern-
ments through tax expenditures. Income earners in Saskatchewan and
Canada which attain the highest gross tax expenditure dollar are in
the $15-20 thousand income group. In the nation as a whole, $4.6 bil-
lion is transferred to this category. Some $175 million is received by
this group in Saskatchewan. At this level of analysis it could be
argued that those that gain the most assistance through tax break pro-
grams consist of low to middle income earners.
The telling impact of tax expenditures is, however, most apparent
in the column which presents the average tax benefit per person
within each income range. As incomes go up, cash transfers through
tax expenditures increase. However, in both Canada and Saskatchewan
there are two noticeable jumps in these average benefit These occur
after incomes of $100 thousand dollars are exceeded. Before this thres-
hold is reached the maximum tax return hovers just above $8
thousand. Once this is passed, cash transfers to individuals earning up
to $200 thousand jump by 131 percent in Canada and 153 percent in
Saskatchewan. The average tax returns are $19,870 and $20,830
respectively.
Even this substantial increase is paled by the tax expenditure dol-
lars that go to the very rich (those with incomes above $200
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thousand). In Canada this select group gained an average of $101,620
per person. This represents a tax expenditure growth of some 355 per-
cent above those with income between $100 and $200 thousand. The
Saskatchewan pattern is similar although less pronounced. The very
rich receive some $83,140 per person, an increase of 299 percent over
the tax expenditure incomes attained by those in the preceeding
income category.
Foregone government revenue in the form of tax expenditures that
are given to the rich and very rich is considerable. Over $1.9 billion is
lost to those with incomes above $100,000. More than a billion dollars
in tax expenditures go to the very rich, with reported pre-tax average
incomes of $355,000. In Saskatchewan 2009 residents with incomes
above $100,000 gain $56.8 million. The richest 241 people, with an
average pre-tax income of some $280 thousand, get over $20 million of
this lost revenue.
The findings in Table 1 offer additional evidence that tax expendi-
ture transfers are primarily regressive. Personal taxation tends to
reinforce and augment existing income inequalities instead of altering
the distribution of incomes in Canada. However, in both the national
and provincial data sets, this regressiveness is most clearly marked
once high incomes are attained. The amount of revenue lost by govern-
ments just to the top earners is enormous and indicates that there is a
pool of untapped revenue available to governments for its other spend-
ing programs
Conclusion
The transfer system examined in this paper benefits the rich and
particularly the very rich. Unlike direct transfers programs targetted
to the poor, tax transfers to the rich are seldom subject to political and
public scrutiny. One reason for this is that governments do not pro-
duce as readily available documentation on tax expenditures as they
do for welfare related spending. However, the outcomes of both
transfer systems are similar. First, these expenditures enhance the
personal income of recipients. Second, both transfer programs place a
strain on government revenue. The main differences, however, are
that tax expenditures are hidden and most clearly benefit the rich and
very rich. Tax expenditures erode the ideal of progressive taxation.
They exacerbate existing inequalities that exist in this country because
substantial incomes are necessary before people can qualify for income
trans fers through the tax system. If progressive taxation, only for the
rich and very rich, was enforced, governments could augment their
savings and gain additional resources for more progressive and equit-
able social programs.
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